On 10 November, David Cameron sent a letter to European Council president Donald Tusk, finally setting out his demands for renegotiation of the terms of British membership in the EU. But Tusk believes that an agreement cannot be reached at this week’s European Council.
In his own letter to EU leaders on 7 December, Tusk said that Cameron’s proposals were “difficult” but suggested that it would be possible “to prepare a concrete proposal to be finally adopted in February”.
The CER has conducted interviews with government representatives and analysts from all the EU member-states and mapped their responses to Cameron’s reform proposals. While the positions of member-states will certainly evolve during the negotiations, the CER’s initial conclusions are as follows:
What prospects are there for compromise on Cameron’s reform proposals?
The feasible: David Cameron can claim a quick win on the EU’s competitiveness agenda. He can also secure a greater role for national parliaments, although it is not yet clear if member-states will agree to turn ‘yellow cards’ into red ones, or merely strengthen the existing ‘yellow card’ procedure. The rest of the EU will also probably agree that the UK should not be obliged to pursue an ‘ever closer union’ although some member-states fear a domino effect, with populist parties elsewhere in Europe demanding similar exemptions. Cameron may also obtain a guarantee against funding Eurozone bail-outs. Member-states will probably agree to reassure Cameron that nothing the eurozone does should damage the single market
The possible: Cameron will find it hard, but perhaps not impossible, to secure a mechanism enabling Britain and other euro-outs to delay decisions that in their view damage the single market. Member-states may also eventually compromise on Cameron’s demand to curb child allowances for children who are not resident in the UK.
The difficult: Cameron will struggle to secure formal recognition that euro membership is voluntary for all member-states, though language may be found which acknowledges that EU countries use different currencies. But Cameron’s hardest battle is on in-work benefits. Some member-states share his concerns about the strain that EU migration may put on public services or labour markets. But all EU countries, perhaps with the exception of Ireland and Finland, will oppose measures that discriminate between British and other EU citizens and therefore violate the current EU treaties.
Which member-states will help Cameron and which will make his life difficult?
Cameron hopes he can count on his ‘all-weather friends’ in the EU like Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. These countries are most likely to vote with Britain in the Council of Ministers. But voting patterns in the Council of Ministers do not necessarily reflect the positions leaders will take on the British renegotiation. There is more at stake in negotiations on the British question than in ordinary Council votes on EU draft legislation.
Cameron will also find allies among member-states that enjoy strong historical and cultural bonds with the UK, such as Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.
Hungary and Poland will be Cameron’s closest allies in Central Europe. But like many other member-states, they will strongly oppose measures that would discriminate between their own citizens and the British.
There are also several hardliners in other areas of negotiations. Austria, Belgium and Estonia do not share Cameron’s ideas for safeguarding the interest of euro-outs in the wider EU. And Spain is opposed to giving a greater role to national parliaments. But opposition from one or a few countries to a particular reform is unlikely to torpedo the entire reform package.
The majority of member-states is prepared to meet Cameron halfway on most of his demands. Germany, France and Italy will be pivotal. If Cameron strikes a conciliatory tone and keeps his demands modest, they will help him and encourage hardliners to follow suit. But if Cameron bangs the table and questions fundamental principles of the European project, they will take a harder line, complicating his efforts to forge an agreement.
This is an extract from a policy brief published by the Centre for European Reform and reprinted here with the author’s permission.